We investigate the voting rules in the Council of the European Union. It is known that both the current system, according to the Treaty of Nice, and the voting system proposed in the Lisbon treaty deviate strongly from the square root law by Penrose which is known to be the ideal voting rule under certain assumptions. In 2004 S lomczynski andŻyczkowski designed a voting system, now known as the Jagiellonian Compromise, which satisfies the square root law with very high accuracy. In this system each member state obtains a voting weight proportional to the square root of the population. Then the quota is fixed in such a way that the voting power of each country is also proportional to the square root of the population.
Introduction
Political power, notably voting power, can be measured through the concept of Power Indices [FM98] , [TP08] . In particular, the Banzhaf Index measures how frequently a given voter is decisive in a voting panel if all voting outcomes are counted with the same weight (for details see [TP08] or our discussion below).
The Council of the European Union is a typical example where Power Indices can help to understand the power structure within this legislative body. In fact, with its current 27 members and the complicated decision rules voting in the Council is hard to analyze without using mathematical tools. The Council consists of one representative of each member state. The members of the Council have different voting power depending, in a nonsystematic way, on the size of the country they represent. The current voting system, according to the Treaty of Nice, has three components. The first component requires the majority of states, the second a qualified majority with respect to voting weights (see table 1) assigned to the states by the treaty. The third component requires that the supporters of a proposal represent at least 62% of the Union's population.
The draft constitution contained a new voting system for the Council, the 'double majority'. This system was adopted by the Reform Treaty (Treaty of Lisbon), which is currently under discussion, despite its rejection in a referendum in Ireland. The double majority, as the name suggests, has two components. To make a proposal pass the Council members supporting it must represent both a qualified majority (55%) of the states and a qualified majority (65%) of the population of the European Union.
Obviously, these two voting systems are very different. In fact, they lead to very different distributions of power among the states. Thus, the question arises, how a fair voting system should look
like. An answer to this was given by Lionel Penrose as early as 1946 [Pe46] . Penrose computed, what is now known as the Banzhaf Index β(N ) for a voter in a country with population N . Penrose [Pe46] , [FM98] . There are various considerations about the Council of the EU in connection with the square root law [Ad05] , [BBGW00] , [Bi04] , [Bo04] , [BW04] , [FM00] , [HM02] , [Ho00] , [HT06] , [Ki01] , [Ko05] , [Le02] , [Li04] , [LM03] , [LM04] , [LW98] , [MN07] , [Mo02] , [Pa05] , [Pl04] , [So04] , [Su00] , [SZ04] , [SZ07a] , [TW00] , [Wi03] . In particular, it is well known that both the voting rules of the Nice Treaty and those of the Treaty of Lisbon deviate strongly from the square root distribution of power. Consequently, those voting systems distribute the voting power unequally among the citizens of the member states [ABF04] , [BJ04] , [BW03a] , [BW03b] , [BW04] , [FM04a] , [FM04b] , [FPS03] , [Le02] , [Pl03] , [Pl04] , [PS03] .
In 2004 two Polish scientists, Wojciech S lomczynski and KarolŻyczkowski devised a voting system known as the 'Jagiellonian Compromise' [SZ04] , [SZ07a] . In this system each member state obtains a voting weight proportional to the square root of its population. This does not automatically give a distribution of power according to the square root law. However, S lomczynski andŻyczkowski observed that this is the case with a particular choice of the quota, i.e. the threshold to reach a qualified majority. In fact, they found that with a quota of 61.4% the voting power (as measured by the Banzhaf Index) agrees to a very high degree of accuracy with the square root law.
The Jagiellonian Compromise was put forward by the Polish government on the EU summit in Brussels in 2007. However, the heads of states and governments rejected this system in favor of the double majority. Presumably, at this late stage the summit did not want to change the voting rules completely. One might hope that it would be much easier to keep either the basic rules of the Nice Treaty or those of the Lisbon Treaty and modify a few voting rules. For example, one could just change the quota involved in such a way that one gets closer to the square root law.
It is our task in this paper to explore to which extent one can approximate the square root distribution of power by adjusting the quota in the Nice system and for the double majority. We compute the Banzhaf Indices for a large variety of quota for the different components of the voting systems. These results are compared to the square root law. As a measure of deviation from the square root law we consider the sum over all member states of the squared deviations as well as the maximum (over the states) of the deviation from the square root law.
Besides the distribution of power within the Council we also take into consideration the ability of the body to make decisions, i.e. the efficiency of the system. This value, also known as decision probability, is given by the percentage of the constellation of votes, which make a proposal pass:
The higher the efficiency the easier to change the status quo, the lower the efficiency the easier to block a change. It is clear that an increase of quota will decrease the systems efficiency. While one might argue that the efficiency of the Council should not be too high to avoid domination of a big minority of states by a small majority, the efficiency must also be not too low to ensure the EU's ability to make decisions at all.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 3 we give a brief introduction of the voting systems towards the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon. In section 3 we introduce the theory of voting power and a fair distribution of voting weights. In this context the square root law of Penrose will be explained. The Jagiellonian Compromise, a voting system which fulfills the square root law, is mentioned in section 4. With our acquired knowledge we analyze the two treaties in detail, in particular, the obvious defects concerning the distribution of voting weights, voting power and the effectiveness will be discussed in section 5. The fifth section is the main part of this paper. Here, we introduce our course of action to improve the two treaties towards the principle of equality under European citizens. We present and discuss our results and give a compromise solution for the current state of affairs. The last section of this paper contains concluding remarks. Mathematical analyses have shown that the three voting criteria have different effects as far as the voting outcome concerned. The first condition is the most significant one: If a qualified majority of voting weights is achieved, then in the most instances these voting weights are given by a simple majority of Member States. In contrast, the third condition has a much similar effect on the voting outcome: The probability of forming a coalition which would meet only the first and second but not the third condition is extremely low [FM01] , [Ki01] . Moreover, most experts agree that Nice has major drawbacks. A first one lies in the decision making efficiency of the voting body. The decision making efficiency is equal to the probability that a random proposal will be passed by vote. Here, the value of this quantity is very low with 2.03% 1. At least 55% of the Member States vote in favor is required (15 of 27).
2. The Member States forming the qualified majority represent at least 65% of the overall population of the European Union.
In addition, a blocking minority must include at least four Members, failing which the qualified majority shall be deemed attained. We disregard this last condition because it has no appreciable effect. The same procedure is also contained in the draft constitution of the European Convention. Summarizing, one might receive the impression that the voting system according to Lisbon is "better" or "more fair" than the one according to Nice. Analyses have shown that this is not the case: A fair voting system of the European Union Council of Ministers should be based on a compromise between the two principles: "equality of Member States" and, in particular, "equality of citizens". Both the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon violate these two fundamental requirements. We will verify this statement due to concepts of the theory of voting power and its fair distribution.
The theory of voting power
Voting systems consist of a set of voters and voting rules. The voting rules determine whether a proposal is accepted or not. Frequently, there are voting weights assigned to each voter.
Additionally a decision threshold is defined: a proposal will be passed if the sum of the weights of the members, who vote in favor, meets or exceeds the given threshold.
An important aspect of voting systems is the political power of the members which is also known as voting power. Voting power is a mathematical concept which quantifies the influence a voter has on election at the system. Its theory can be traced back to works of Penrose and Banzhaf [Pe46] , [Ba65] . (See also [SS54] , [DP78] , [Jo78] for alternative concepts.) Assume a member can either vote in favor or against a proposal within a decision. Then he or she has influence on the decision if he or she can turn the voting outcome by changing his or her voting behavior (to make the proposal pass by voting in favor and to make it fail otherwise). In such a situation a member is decisive. This decisiveness is the basic idea behind voting power [FM98] .
There are several methods to measure the voting power of a member. These methods are developed in the theory of the indices of political power (see books [FM98] , [TP08] Banzhaf Index is defined as follows. Assume n is the number of members of a voting system.
Consider each possible coalition within a member i. These are 2 n−1 . Then, the total Banzhaf Index of i, T B i , is equal to the number of coalitions for which i is decisive. The normalized Banzhaf Index of i, N B i , is equal to the probability that i is decisive:
2 n−1 . Finally, the percentage of influence i has is given by the Banzhaf Index of i, β i =
. This quantity expresses the relative share of potential voting power of a member i in the voting body. For example see the distribution of voting power of the European Economic Community of 1958-1972 in [TP08] . Additionally, little shifts of quota yield to different voting power distributions.
Generally, the voting power of a member is not equal to his voting weight. This is due to the situation that voting power held by a given country depends not only on its voting weight but also on the distribution of the weights among all remaining Member States. In the case of the To obtain a system with an ideal or fair distribution of voting power it is obvious to choose the voting weight of each Member State proportional to the square root of its population, thus equal to √ N i . This is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. Finally, the distribution of voting power depends on the quota (the threshold to make a proposal pass). There exists an optimal quota for which the voting power of any state is proportional to its voting weight [FLMR07] , [SZ06] , [SZZ06] , [SZ07b] . To gain this optimal quota q 0 we use the method of least squares:
That choice of q which has its least value of the sum of squared residuals σ q is our demanded quota. Thus, we minimize the value of the term σ
2 which depends on the given quota q. σ 2 q is also called error rate. In addition, the value of The European Union is not only a union of individuals but also a union of states. An additional requirement of a simple majority of Member States ("One State, One Vote") would cause only a moderate deviation from the ideal case [Ki04] , [KMSZ04] , [KSZ07] . Indeed a new optimal quota q * 0 can be calculated with less discrepancies in the voting power distribution than with the previous q 0 . Therefore we have to use the method of least squares again.
Beyond a fair distribution of influence we should consider the effectiveness of a system. Effectiveness is equal to the decision probability the voting body passes a proposal. This quantity is also called the Coleman power of a collectivity act [Co71] . Assuming that all coalitions are equally likely its value is given by the percentage of the constellation of votes, which make a proposal pass: The higher the effectiveness the easier to change the status quo, the lower the rate the easier to block a change. So, the degree of the effectiveness depends on the given voting rules, in particular the quotas.
Voting systems based on the square root low of Penrose were proposed and discussed many times.
One of the best-known proposals is the Jagiellonian Compromise.
The Jagiellonian Compromise
In 2004 the polish scientists, Wojciech S lomczynski and KarolŻyczkowski, from the Jagiellonian University of Kraków, Poland, presented a voting system for the Council of Ministers of the European Union, the Jagiellonian Compromise [SZ04] , [SZ06] , [SZ07a] . They constructed a voting system as follows: The voting weight of each Member State is chosen according to the square root law of Penrose, thus equal to √ N i where N i is the population factor of the i-th Member State. Then, an optimal quota q is calculated using the methods above. The Jagiellonian Compromise is also known as P − q% solution due to the work of Penrose.
With current population data we gain an optimal quota q 0 = 61.5% with a minimal error rate of 0.00005 . Our analyses have shown that the maximal relative deviation between β 0i and its corresponding β q 0 i is about the less value of 0.14%. In addition, the effectiveness value is about 16.43%. For voting weights and voting power see table 2. Some advantages arise from the proposed voting system: First of all it is simple, because it is based on a single criterion, more precisely, only one condition must be satisfied. It is neutral by reason that it cannot a priori favor or handicap any Member State. It is fair, because every citizen has the same potential influence on decisions regardless from his home country. It is transparent in the case that voting power and voting weight are almost equal. It is easy extendible: any new Member State achieves a voting weight proportional to the square root of its population factor.
Solely a new optimal quota must be calculated. It is moderately efficient because an addition of Member States does not decrease the effectiveness.
On closer observation the additional requirement of a simple majority of Member States (in the following denoted by JC+) is postulated with an equal q 0 . That yields to an error rate of 0.07425 . The relative voting power deviation takes a maximum value of 30.64%. This is no more a moderate deviation from the ideal case. Only the effectiveness value almost levels off with 16.08%. Observing the least squares we gain a new optimal quota of q * 0 = 64.7%. Here, the error rate takes its minimum value of 0.03275 . This is only the half of the error rate value than with an unchanged quota. The maximal relative deviation is only about 11.68%. This is nearly one third in comparison with q 0 . However, the effectiveness decreases on the lower value of 10.39%. In terms of an as best as possible fair distribution of voting the quota q * should be applied. Figure 1 shows that the voting power of the JC+ 64.7-solution is better approximated to Penrose's β 0 than the JC+ 61.5-solution. 
Penrose vs. the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon
With the acquired knowledge about voting power and its fair distribution we will have a second = 48.15%), 15 up to 55.55%, also 18 up to 66.66%. For each given integer majority, we shift the overall population quota (currently 65%) from 51% up to 85% in steps of 0.1%.
Beyond our boundary values the error rate significantly increases. This is due to the fact, that a higher quota give more power to smaller states (a proposal will be passed with almost unanimity) and lower quota more power to bigger states. Furthermore, we want to include the corresponding effectiveness value within our approach of optimization. It is easy to see that the decision making efficiency goes to zero with increasing quota.
In the case of the Treaty of Nice our calculations have produced the threshold tuple (14/263/80%) due to the least minimal error rate of 0.2286 . Compared with the Jagiellonian Compromise (0.00005 ) Nice's best possible error rate still deviates strongly from the ideal case. This is also indicated by a maximal relative deviation in voting power with 42.9% (JC: 0.14%). Therewith, the effectiveness is very low with 0.99%.
In the case of the Treaty of Lisbon our calculations have produced the threshold tuple (17/77.5%) due to the least minimal error rate of 0.52118 . Compared with Nice the best possible error rate of Lisbon is additionally 127% higher. This is also indicated by a maximal relative deviation in voting power with 135.51% (JC: 0.14%). Concluding, the effectiveness is very low with 2.23% thus near to Nice in its current version. Moreover, these optimizations due to the error rates lead to a very low effectiveness. Thus, in such voting systems it would be easy to block proposals.
Due to these results we reconsider our analyses and include the effectiveness values in our solution approach. One approach might be to find a compromise between current error rate, optimal error rate and a reasonable decision probability. Therefore, we are geared to the effectiveness value of the Jagiellonian Compromise including the requirement of a simple majority of Member States thus 10.39%. According to the Treaty of Nice we refer to the threshold tuple (14/220/66%).
We gain an error rate of 1.07 , a maximal relative deviation of 37.43% and an effectiveness of 10.52%. According to Treaty of Lisbon we refer to the threshold tuple (15/67.5%). This yield to an error rate of 1.5975 , a deviation of 106.62% and an effectiveness of 10.36%. Certainly, there are several solutions for constellations of effectiveness and error rate values supposable.
But, by now it might be conceivable that it needs many new debates among the Member States and a lot of time to find such distribution keys. Penrose's solution of a fair distribution of voting power in such a voting body. In this publication we tried to improve these treaties with respect to such a fair distribution. To do so we modified the voting rules by keeping the voting weights and only shifting the thresholds. This procedure results only in a modest improvement of the system. Even with optimal quota both systems deviate strongly from a fair distribution of power. Thus, both the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon turn out to be invariably suboptimal.
As a consequence the voting system for the Council has to be changed in a more fundamental way than merely adjusting quota. It seems to us that the Jagiellonian Compromise is a good basis for a new voting system.
